The Battle of Plataea, August 479 BC

The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second Persian invasion of Greece. It took place in 479 BC near the city of Plataea in Boeotia, and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states, including Sparta, Athens, Corinth and Megara, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I.

The Battle of Plataea is the same day among with the Battle of Mycale

The previous year the Persian invasion force, led by the Persian king in person, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and conquered Thessaly, Boeotia, Euboea and Attica. However, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis, the Allied Greek navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory, preventing the conquest of the Peloponnesus. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year.

In the summer of 479 BC the Greeks assembled a huge (by ancient standards) army and marched out of the Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp near Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime cavalry terrain around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted 11 days. While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek battle line fragmented. Thinking the Greeks in full retreat, Mardonius ordered his forces to pursue them, but the Greeks (particularly the Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians) halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian infantry and killing Mardonius.

A large portion of the Persian army was trapped in its camp and slaughtered. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycale, decisively ended the invasion. After Plataea and Mycale the Greek allies would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars. Although Plataea was in every sense a resounding victory, it does not seem to have been attributed the same significance (even at the time) as, for example, the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon or the Spartan defeat at Thermopylae.

Battle of Plataea - Background

In 480 BC, a large Persian army led by Xerxes invaded Greece. Though briefly checked during the opening phases of the Battle of Thermopylae in August, he eventually won the engagement and swept through Boeotia and Attica capturing Athens. Falling back, Greek forces fortified the Isthmus of Corinth to prevent the Persians from entering the Peloponnesus. That September, the Greek fleet won a stunning victory over the Persians at Salamis. Concerned that the victorious Greeks would sail north and destroy the pontoon bridges he had built over the Hellespont, Xerxes withdrew to Asia with the bulk of his men.

Before departing, he formed a force under the command of Mardonius to complete the conquest of Greece.

Assessing the situation, Mardonius elected to abandon Attica and withdrew north to Thessaly for the winter. This allowed the Athenians to reoccupy their city. As Athens was not protected by the defenses on the isthmus, Athens demanded that an Allied army be sent north in 479 to deal with the Persian threat. This was met with reluctance by Athens' allies, despite the fact that the Athenian fleet was required to prevent Persian landings on the Peloponnesus.

Sensing an opportunity, Mardonius attempted to woo Athens away from the other Greek city-states. These entreaties were refused and the Persians began marching south forcing Athens to be evacuated. With the enemy in their city, Athens, along with representatives of Megara and Plataea, approached Sparta and demanded that an army be sent north or they would defect to the Persians. Aware of the situation, the Spartan leadership was convinced to send aid by Chileos of Tegea shortly before the emissaries arrived. Arriving in Sparta, the Athenians were surprised to learn that an army was already on the move.

The Diplomatic Background

Mardonius was certainly interested in exploring that last possibility. He sent King Alexander of Macedon to the Athenians with a peace offer. If Athens would submit to Persia and join her military alliance she would be granted autonomy, have all of her territory restored to her and be allowed to expand into new areas and Xerxes would help pay for the restoration of the temples he had destroyed in the previous year. Alexander added his support to this offer, on the grounds that the Greeks couldn't hope to defeat the Persians permanently and the best that Athens could hope for would be to a constant battlefield.

The Athenians used this offer to force the Spartans to come and fight. They made sure that Alexander's embassy was delayed until an embassy from Sparta had reached them. The Spartans offered to support the women and non-combatants of Athens for the duration of the war, but didn’t make any concrete offers of military assistance. According to Herodotus the Athenian response to Alexander was they loved freedom too much to ever accept Persian rule. The Spartans were thanked for their offer of financial support, which was turned down, and then urged to send their army out of the Peloponnese to deal with the Persians.
Greek hoplite and Persian warrior depicted fighting on an ancient kylix. 5th century BC

The two commanders
Pausanias (? - 408 BC)
Nephew of Leonidas, Thermopylae Hero (fell against the Persians), Pausanias was the temporary King of Sparta as guardian of Pleistarchus (son of Leonidas), King by right, but still a minor. This situation granted him the command of all the Allied forces, but was not sure that this was role that perhaps he expected. The real winners were the spartans infantrymen, the Hoplites. In fact does not risult that the Greek leader has given a clue in war with indisputable actions dictated by tactical intuition. Surely we know that Pausanias, after the victory at Plataea, led the Greek fleet to the conquest of the Bosphorus and, since then, its political interests took a turn to the East in stark contrast with the sober-minded Warrior, typical of Spartans. This attitude caused him the forced come back to his homeland, but once returned later in the Dardanelles to settle here, he wove strange and complicated political relations with the Persians, which secured the Athenian antipathy. The same athenians managed, shortly after 471 BC, to get permission from Sparta to drive him out from the Dardanelles. So Pausanias decided to return to his homeland once again, in this case to seize power, supported by the Helots (the Helots were Spartans slaves belonging to the State) and by Themistocles (also banished from Athens), in an attempt to overthrow the oligarchic Government that was erected at the city's command. But was once again politically defeated and sentenced for treason (due to his contacts with the Persians). He tried to save his own life and take refuge in the Temple of Athena, where he couldn't be touched because of tradition, so was walled up alive.

The figure of this Persian conqueror dates back only to the Persian wars. Son-in-law or nephew of Darius I, in 492 BC was appointed by the King to wage war to Greece and put under Persian control throughout the northern Aegean and Thrace. Mardonius in fact, well started his adventure as Commander conquering the island of Thasos, but had no great fortune later. He lost 300 ships due to a storm that took his fleet near Mount Athos, forcing him to return back.
As described by the poet Herodotus, the Persians had as fundamental characteristic: great skill on horseback and archery; they were bearers of great ability; but above all, great courage in the battle. Mardonius too was certainly provided of great courage (as many of the Persian leaders, he preferred to die in battle rather than recoil), but it was lacking in sincerity. Indeed, Herodotus recounts that, to his own King Xerxes, Mardonius reported that the Greeks had far less fearsome than expected, perhaps because, according to him, they chose the battlefield more for beauty than for its practicality. These were opinions that ranged in contrast with what was told in Persia of the Greeks, but, above all, was a great falsehood that the Commander discovers and will pay a dear price showing his true character: beside his courage he lurked an enormous presumption.

The Persian Empire
The Medes and Persian populations of Indo-European origin settled in the Iranian plateau in the third millennium, occupying the richest part of the region with water currents, mines of copper, lead and iron. The Persians were a civilized people, had already tamed the horse and knew how to work the iron, two unknown activities to many of their "neighbors" like the Semites. Then, in the 6th century, as logical, the Persians began the construction of their empire. The first great Persian leader was Cyrus the great, who conquered the Kingdom of the Medes, Lydia of Croesus, the territories in the East to the Indus River and in 538 b.c. Babylon. His successors prosecuted his project: Cambyses seized Egypt (battle of Pelusium in 525 BC) and Darius I started an admirable administrative organization that consolidated the Empire.
The Persians were remembered for great public works as the many bridges in masonry, for efficient postal service, for the road that linked the capitals of the Kingdom and the capitals of the administrative districts (Provinces), and for maritime connections between the different provinces of the Empire through the opening of a canal from the Nile to the Red Sea, works accomplished thanks to a tax levy ordered and rigorous. But most of all must be give merits to the Persians for the modernity of attaching the basics principles of social management: respect for local cultures and religions, decentralization and decision-making autonomy granted to the provinces, acceptance of the particularities of each economic people from their submissive.
But this forward-thinking directors would bring serious problems; in fact over the years, the Governors of the provinces (satraps) managed to amass great wealth to create private militias difficult to control as their sources of income. This facts went hand in hand with a military weakness due to the fact that people believed that the mission to defend them from enemies beloged to their King and not that they had to protect him. These internal cracks will be completely showned during the advance of Alexander the great which subsequently swept literally the Persians.

A very important role in Greek culture was held by Ionia, with his dodecàpoli (twelve) and Miletus on all. Forced to move mainly by sea, the settlers of Miletus thoroughly studied the sciences as astronomy, and cartography, indispensable for those who must necessarily move to sea. But alongside this great scientific culture, in Miletus flourished one of the earliest philosophical cultures of the Western world whose most famous representatives were: Thales, Anaximenes and the more important, Anaximander (615-540 BC).
Anaximander had been disciple of Thales and already, at that time, stated that the moon shone for the reflected light of the Sun; was the first to publish a geographical map and thanks to him that was introduced in Greece the use of gnomon, already known by the Egyptians, the first tool for modern astronomy. Thanks to this instrument, they could establish hours and seasons, but what is even more important to navigators as the Milesian, they could calculate the latitude coordinates of a specific place.
The Milesian also foundated several empòria, malls that controlled trades of the surrounding areas. Among these one of the most famous in antiquity was the harbour of Sinope, nearby the river Halis, which was the seat of prestigious and thriving shipyards because of the abundance of wood and iron mines in the hinterland.

The battleships
All Persian wars showned for the first time in history, the importance of the battleships: the sea control, over the centuries (with maps), had taken an increasingly important role so to raise the production and the upgrading of warships exponentially. The naval events during this period have only one common element: the Triremes. Their appearance can be dated to around the eighth century BC instead of Pentecontere (50 oars ships), but the models to which reported the Greek shipyard, which built a large quantity, are dating back to the 6th century BC. The characteristics of the Triremes were the great maneuverability and speed. Even the Persians adopted this type of boat so, to facilitate the recognition of the deployment were adopted the "emblems".
These ships had a hull made from pine wood approximately 40 meters long and less than 7 metres wide with a draught of less than 1 meter; long and narrow so as to ensure agility and speed. The propulsion in battle was assured by 170 oarsmen on three levels (hence the name), which could force-wide push the boat to a maximum of 7-8 knots (approximately 13 km/h), while the length of oars depended on the level of paddlers from a maximum of 3 metres to a minimum of 1.60.
But the weapon that certainly characterized the Triremes were the rostrum. The discovery of a 200 pounds block of bronze nearby Israel (but even the various figurative representations of the Roman and Greek boats) made possible to affirm that these blocks were mounted on the prows of ships, water height, so that ramming action could open large holes in the hull of enemy ships and then drown them, a feature that combined with the speed and agility of Triremes became lethal.

The opposing forces
The Greeks
According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men—5,000 Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites (perioeci) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate). This was probably the largest Spartan force ever assembled. The Greek army had been reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states, as shown in the table. Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca historica that the number of the Greek troops approached one hundred thousand.
According to Herodotus, there were a total of 69,500 lightly armed troops—35,000 helots and 34,500 troops from the rest of Greece; roughly one per hoplite. The number of 34,500 has been suggested to represent one light skirmisher supporting each non-Spartan hoplite (33,700), together with 800 Athenian archers, whose presence in the battle Herodotus later notes.Herodotus tells us that there were also 1,800 Thespians (but does not say how they were equipped), giving a total strength of 108,200 men.

The number of hoplites is accepted as reasonable (and possible); the Athenians alone had fielded 10,000 hoplites at the Battle of Marathon.Some historians have accepted the number of light troops and used them as a population census of Greece at the time. Certainly these numbers are theoretically possible. Athens, for instance, allegedly fielded a fleet of 180 triremes at Salamis, manned by approximately 36,000 rowers and fighters.Thus 69,500 light troops could easily have been sent to Plataea. Nevertheless, the number of light troops is often rejected as exaggerated, especially in view of the ratio of seven helots to one Spartiate.For instance, Lazenby accepts that hoplites from other Greek cities might have been accompanied by one lightly armoured retainer each, but rejects the number of seven helots per Spartiate.He further speculates that each Spartiate was accompanied by one armed helot, and that the remaining helots were employed in the logistical effort, transporting food for the army. Both Lazenby and Holland deem the lightly armed troops, whatever their number, as essentially irrelevant to the outcome of battle.

A further complication is that a certain proportion of the Allied manpower was needed to man the fleet, which amounted to at least 110 triremes, and thus approximately 22,000 men. Since the Battle of Mycale was fought at least near-simultaneously with the Battle of Plataea, then this was a pool of manpower which could not have contributed to Plataea, and further reduces the likelihood that 110,000 Greeks assembled before Plataea.

The Greek forces were, as agreed by the Allied congress, under the overall command of Spartan royalty in the person of Pausanias, who was the regent for Leonidas' young son, Pleistarchus, his cousin. Diodorus tells us that the Athenian contingent was under the command of Aristides; it is probable that the other contingents also had their leaders. Herodotus tells us in several places that the Greeks held council during the prelude to the battle, implying that decisions were consensual and that Pausanias did not have the authority to issue direct orders to the other contingents. This style of leadership contributed to the way events unfolded during the battle itself. For instance, in the period immediately before the battle, Pausanias was unable to order the Athenians to join up with his forces, and thus the Greeks fought the battle completely separated from each other

The Persians
According to Herodotus, the Persians numbered 300,000 and were accompanied by troops from Greek city states that supported the Persian cause (including Thebes). Herodotus admits that no one counted the latter, but he guesses that there were about 50,000 of them.

Ctesias, who wrote a history of Persia based on Persian archives, claimed there were 120,000 Persian and 7,000 Greek soldiers, but his account is generally garbled (for instance, placing this battle before Salamis, he also says there were only 300 Spartans, 1000 perioeci and 6000 from the other cities at Plataea, perhaps confusing it with Thermopylae).

Diodorus Siculus claims in his Bibliotheca historica that the number of the Persian troops was some five hundred thousand.

The figure of 300,000 has been doubted, along with many of Herodotus' numbers, by many historians; modern consensus estimates the total number of troops for the Persian invasion at around 250,000. According to this consensus, Herodotus' 300,000 Persians at Plataea would self-evidently be impossible. One approach to estimating the size of the Persian army has been to estimate how many men might feasibly have been accommodated within the Persian camp; this approach gives figures of between 70,000 and 120,000 men. Lazenby, for instance, by comparison with later Roman military camps, calculates the number of troops at 70,000, including 10,000 cavalry. Meanwhile, Connolly derives a number of 120,000 from the same-sized camp. Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. For instance, Delbrück, based on the distance the Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the size of the Persian army, including the supply personnel and other non-combatants.

The Campaign Begins

Once Alexander had delivered the Athenian refusal to the Persian camp Mardonius prepared to march south. He reached Boeotia, where the Thebans tried to convince him to stay there and rely on bribery to break up the Greek coalition. Mardonius disagreed, and instead moved on to Attica, where in mid-summer he occupied an empty Athens. Most of the population was still on Salamis, and the rest was manning the fleet. While he was at Athens Mardonius sent another envoy to the Athenians, but this second offer was also refused. The mood was now so hostile to the Persians that when Lycides, a member of the council, suggested referring the offer to the Athenian people a mob stoned him, his wife and his children to death.

As the Persians were approaching Attica the Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta to plead for help. They arrived while the Spartans were celebrating the Hyacinthia, a religious festival. The Spartans kept putting off their answer, eventually delaying for ten days. Eventually they decided to send an army, worried that the Athenians might actually change side. The first contingent, 5,000 Spartans and 35,000 Helots, was sent out secretly on the day before the Athenian delegates were due to make their final appearance. Command of the army was given to Pausanias, then acting as guardian for Leonidas's young son Pleistarchus. The Athenian ambassadors were startled to discover what the Spartans had done, and were then sent home with another 5,000 Spartan troops, this time made up of perioeci, free men but not Spartan citizens. This odd behaviour on the part of the Spartans appears to have been due to a distrust of their Peloponnesian rivals in Argos, who when they learnt that the Spartans were on the move sent a message to Mardonius to warn him.

When this message reached Mardonius he decided to retreat from Athens to Boeotia, and make his stand near Thebes. Before leaving he destroyed what was left of the city. Soon after leaving Athens the Persians learnt that an advance guard of 1,000 Spartans had reached Megara, on the coast west of Athens. He decided to try and catch this advance guard before the rest of the Spartan army could join it, and turned south. His cavalry was sent ahead, and ravaged the area, but they were unable to catch the Spartans. Mardonius then discovered that the main Peloponnesian force had reached the Isthmus and was heading his way, so decided to return to his original plan. He moved to Decelea in northern Attica, then to Tanagra and from there to Scolus in the territory of Thebes.

Mardonius took up a position along the River Asopus, which runs north-east across Boeotia, from the vicinity of Plataea, past Thebes (which is west of the river), reaching the sea on the north coast opposite Euboea. The Persian lines ran from Plataean territory in the south-west to a position opposite Erythrae, a distance of around 5 miles. Behind his lines he built a square wooden stockade 10 stades (just over 1 mile) on each side. The army was posted to block the main passes from the south into Boeotia, the stockade as a refuge in case the battle went wrong.

The morale of the Persian army doesn't appear to have been high. Herodotus recounts two incidents to support this. At a dinner party in Thebes one senior Persian officer told his Greek dining companions that most of the Persians would soon be dead. The second concerns the reception given to a contingent of 1,000 hoplites from Phocis, who joined the army on the Asopus. Soon after they arrived they were surrounded by the Persian cavalry, and for some time tensions were high. Eventually the Persian cavalry withdrew.

Once the Spartans were on the move they were joined by other contingents from the Peloponnese. The combined army moved up to Eleusis, where they were joined by the Athenians. The Greeks then moved to Erythrae in Boeotia, where they found the Persians facing them on the Asopus. The Greeks took up apposition on the foothills of Mount Cithaeron, facing the Persians across a plain between the mountains and the river. 

Strategic and tactical considerations
In some ways the run-up to Plataea resembled that at the Battle of Marathon; there was a prolonged stalemate in which neither side risked attacking the other.The reasons for this stalemate were primarily tactical, and similar to the situation at Marathon; the Greek hoplites did not want to risk being outflanked by the Persian cavalry and the lightly armed Persian infantry could not hope to assault well-defended positions.

According to Herodotus, both sides wished for a decisive battle that would tip the war in their favor. However, Lazenby believed that Mardonius' actions during the Plataea campaign were not consistent with an aggressive policy. He interprets the Persian operations during the prelude not as attempts to force the Allies into battle but as attempts to force the Allies into retreat (which indeed became the case). Mardonius may have felt he had little to gain in battle and that he could simply wait for the Greek alliance to fall apart (as it had nearly done over the winter).There can be little doubt from Herodotus' account that Mardonius was prepared to accept battle on his own terms, however. Regardless of the exact motives, the initial strategic situation allowed both sides to procrastinate, since food supplies were ample for both armies. Under these conditions, the tactical considerations outweighed the strategic need for action.

When Mardonius' raids disrupted the Allied supply chain, it forced the Allies to rethink their strategy. Rather than now moving to attack, however, they instead looked to retreat and secure their lines of communication Despite this defensive move by the Greeks, it was in fact the chaos resulting from this retreat that finally ended the stalemate. Mardonius perceived this as a full-on retreat, in effect thinking that the battle was already over, and sought to pursue the Greeks.Since he did not expect the Greeks to fight, the tactical problems were no longer an issue and he tried to take advantage of the altered strategic situation he thought he had produced. Conversely, the Greeks had, inadvertently, lured Mardonius into attacking them on the higher ground and, despite being outnumbered, were thus at a tactical advantage.

The battle

Phase 1

General Mardonius, when he saw that the Greeks would not come down into the plain, sent his cavalry, under Masistius to attack them where they were.

Masistius, opted to aim his forces against the Megarians in the middle of the Greek forces, as they were the ones most open to attack, as the ground offered the best approach to the cavalry. The Megarians finding themselves hard pressed by the Persian horse, sent hearlds to the allies to come to their aid. 300 Athenian hoplites rushed to their aid to reinforce the position taking with them their whole body of archers.

A struggle ensured, the horse charging in divisions and the hoplites offering resistance as best they could with their archers firing to keep the calvary at bay.

Masistius, standing out by what he wore had his horse hit by an arrow, the pain causing him to throw his rider. Immediately the hoplites rushed towards him, caught his horse and began to slay him. At first however, his armour hindered them, he wore a breastplate made of golden scales, all the blows had no effect, till one of the soldiers, perceiving the reason, drove his weapon into his eye and so slew him. All this taking place without the horsemen seeing it, they had not observed their leader fall from his horse or seen him slain. When they haltered and so realised what had happend, with loud cheers charged the enemy in one mass, hoping to recover the dead body.

The Athenians now seeing the entire cavalry bare down upon them, called out for reinforcements. Athenian hoplites prepares for battleWith a thunder of hoofs the cavalry crashed into the hoplite lines a great fight taking place for the body. The Athenians coming out the worse of the encounter and abandoning the body. But before it could be carryed away the reinforcements arrived. The Persian horse unable to hold their ground fled, empty handed. Retiring to consider what to do next, being without a leader, it seemed to them the fittest course to return to Mardonius.

When they reached their fort, the Persian army publically mourned their generals loss. Shaving off their hair, and cutting the mane off their horses and venting their grief in loud cries for all of the Greek army to hear. Because they had lost the man, next to Mardonius, who the Persian King and Persians generally, held in the greatest esteem.

The Greeks on the other hand, now showing much courage than before the skirmish, seeing not only that they stood their ground against the attack of the horse, but had even made them retreat. They paraded the dead body to the ranks of the army for all to see.

The Persians now in mourning and the Greeks oozing in confindence. The Greeks decided to move from where they were to a place with more water, to the spring of Garaphia. 
Phase 2

In true Greek fashion, no sooner had they got the Persians on the backfoot than internal conflict broke out between the independant city-states. The Athenians and the Tegeans nearly coming to blows over who should hold down the important left wing position. The Spartans naturally, in charge of the prestigious right wing. Daily now too, the Greek side who were riding high on their success so far, had their numbers swell, as more Greeks flocked to the cause from day to day.
Successfully moving to be closer to the natural spring of Garaphia, and taking advance of a hill of no considerable height.

When the mourning period had passed, Mardonius learning that the Greeks had moved closer to them at the Asopus marshalled his troops against them. Strategically, placing his best troops the Persians against the Spartans, more deep than usual, all the way until they also partly faced the Tegeans. Next to them came the Medes, as they were the next best available to face the Peloponnesians. The Macedonians and the tribes that dwelled about Thessaly, were matched against the Athenians. The rest of the nations held the middle ground. 300,000 thousand stood against a Greek force of 110,000. There were many Greek cities that alligned with the Persians, mostly from the north, who either wanted or had to join. The Phocians for example had 1,000 with the Persians, however their were many who did not side with them and were raiding the Persian camps and food supplies when available, generally causing a headache for the Persian side, during the ordeal.

After a day of a stand-off, the next day both sides proeeded to offer sacrifice. The Grecian sacrifice was offered by Tisamenus ((for his interesting story of how he go this job, go here)). Tisamenus stated that the victims were favourable, if the Greeks stood on the defensive, but not if they began the battle or crossed the river Asopus.

By contrast, the Persian side, very eager to do battle found their victims not favorable, the Elean Hegesistratus was their soothsayer ((go here to see his past)). So no battle was to take place.

The sacrifices not being favorable for either side to begin to do battle, began to frustrat the Greeks allinged with the Persians as they were witnessing their own numbers dwindle as their men openly began to change sides and pour into the opposite camp, continually increasing their numbers.

As to why the soothsayers continually relayed the message that the side that begins the battle will loose the war. The most reasonable thought is that the defending side held too much of an advantage. For the Greeks to attack the Persians while they were still in their fort was not practical. Greek hoplites did their best warfare via the phalanx and rushing a fort nullified this, plus Spartans had little if any practice of siege warfare that would be needed, Persian arrows would shower down on them. For the Persians to attack on the other hand, their best advantage lay in the open plains where their horses could do most damage. The Greek remaining at the foothills, always held the advantage of withdrawing to the moutains, pulling the Perisans away from their base and fighting a battle that did not suit them. Both sides remembering what Leonidas and the 300 did to the Persian advance at Thermopylae less than a year before, with these thoughts still fresh in everybodies mind I think that these are the real reason the soothsayers were reluctant to issue a decree proclaiming victory.

A Theban had advised Mardonius to keep a watch on the passes of Mt Cithaeron as these were the ways that the Greeks were continually getting supplies. By the eighth day from when both sides had first encamped, that evening the Persian horse was let out and quickly moved into one of the passes that was known to be used for supplies; it was not in vain. They came across pack-animals, 500 in total bringing provisions from the Peloponnese just coming down into the plain. All were slaughtered, neither man nor best was left alive. After taking what ever they could the horse returned back.

For the next two days, neither army was wishing to begin the fight. The Persians advancing to the river Asopus, trying in vain to get the Greeks to cross; but neither side was willing to cross the stream. The Persian horse harassed and annoyed the greeks incessantly. The Thebans being zealous of the Medes cause, kept pressing for battle, but they were always held back in check by the Persians.

By the eleventh day from the time when the two hosts first took station, there was a conference held between Mardonius and Artabuzus. Artabuzus stated that the Greeks seemed to increase in size every day and that it might be better to break up from their quarters as soon as possible and withdraw the whole army to the fortified town of Thebes where they had abundant stores of corn for themselves. His idea stemmed from the belief that they needed only to sit quite. The Persians had plenty of coin, all that was needed was to buy off their leaders and towns, it wouldn't be long before the Greeks gave up their liberty without risking battle. The Thebans agreeing with Artabuzus, obviously, conserned about the Greeks growning strength.

Mardonius would have none of it, he being left in charge of the army it was his belief that their army vastly outnumbered the Greeks, and while the victims where not being favorable, they should still be prepared for the battle that was going to take place. So with Mardonius giving his sentiments, no one ventured to say no to him.

This however concerned him and so he asked for the captain of the squadrons and the leaders of the Greeks to be sent for. He then asked them. 'Did they know of any prophecy which said that the Persians were to be destroyed in Greece?' All were silent, some because they didn't know, others because they thought it not safe to speak out. He (sorry, need to research the name) proceeded to tell the oracle 'The Persians shall come into Greece, sack the temple at Delphi, and when they have so done, perish one and all'.

The Persians had not sacked Delphi nor would go to the temple, thereby proving this orcale obselete. He asked them to be ready for battle in the morning and be confinent or victory.

That night the leader of the Macedonians, Alexander ((Alexander the Greats grandfather)) sneaked out of the camp and rode up to the Greek sentry guarding the allied Greeks post. Asking to speak to the Athenian Generals, calling them by name, while many stood on guard against the intruder, others ran to awaken them. Once they had arrived he spoke about the following.

All that he was about to say was to be held in trust, except to the Spartan general Pausanias. Mardonius couldn't obtain favorable omens, had it not been for this the battle would have taken place long ago. He now seems ready to let the victims pass unheeded, and as soon as the day dawns, he intends to engage you in battle. He seems to be afraid that you daily increase in number. With these words still ringing in their ears, he left and rode back to his post.

The Athenian Generals then went to the right wing and entered the Spartan camp and told Pausanias all that they had learnt from Alexander.
The Athenian Generals were agreeable to this and understood the reasoning behind the decision. Stating that they too amoungst themselves had played with the idea but thought, that perhaps their words might not be pleasing to the Spartans.

Very early the next morning, the Spartans and the Athenian contingent changed sizes, and by the time dawn had come about were ready to receive the Persians. The Boeotians when they were use to facing the Athenians but now seemed to be facing the Spartans immediately sent a heard to Mardonius to tell him. ((It is obvious from this part of the story that the switch that took place was not immediatly obvious to all concered. For the Boeotians to notice seems reasonable, they were a Greek city-state and so knew the Athenian and Spartan forces having battle against previously. And they would rather battle the Athenians than the Spartan forces, they would be the first to point out that they were going to have to battle the Spartan forces. But that nobody else to realise seems to indicate that there was no standard uniform worn by the Greek forces. No red cloaks worn by the Spartans, no lamda on their shields, no distinctive marks to place one solider from the other. Most of the uniforms occured much later in the second half of the Pelopponesian War.

Then again this changing and rechanging seems a bit iffy in the story, and very late considering this is all happening more than 10 days worth of lining up ready for battle))

Mardonius issued orders to change the Persian side to face the Spartans and the Greeks allined with Persia to the other side. There plans thus discovered, the Athenians and Spartans returned to their original posts, shortly after the Persians too returned to their original post sending their Greek allies back to theirs. Mardonius then sent out a hearld to pester the Spartans in saying that Spartans claim to never turn your backs in flight nor quit your ranks but either destroy their adversaries or die trying. But this morning you flee your posts and wishing to go against our slaves while leaving the Athenians to face us. He asked if the Spartans are brave enough to face only the Persians in the open field winner take all, the Persians were willing to agree to this. To this no answer was given till at last the hearld left unable to get a rise out of the Greek side.

Mardonius was overjoyed at what the heald had to say on his return, seening that the Spartans did not want to face them. Issued orders for the remaining cavlary to go out and harrass them with their arrows and javlins.

The Greeks now though not hard pressed had a problem, where they were stationed, the Spartans had easy access to the Gargaphia fountain, which by now had chocked up, so many men using it for a number of days. And where they had easy access to the stream of the Asopus, the now bothersom arrows and javlins being launched by the Persian horse made getting water a problem. Plus all the provisions they had brought with them were gone. The attendants that had been given orders to return with provsions were being harrassed by the Persian horse, which had now closed the passage.

The Greeks held a council where it was agreed to that if the Persians did not give battle that day, the Greeks would move to the tract of ground in front of Plataea, where a stream of water divides into two and would give them the water they desiered while being able to cover the pass to get their provisions. ((the two streams giving them every oppotunity to get water as the Persian horse wouldn't be able to harrass them now being able to get water from both sides of their lines)). They would need to send out a fair number of their troops ((about half of all the troops)) to go through the mountain passes to make sure no remanance of Persian forces were lying in wait.

They decided to march out on the second watch of the night, so that they might not be harassed by the Persian horse in making the manouver.

Througout that whole day, they were continually harrassed by the Persian cavalry and suffered in silence until dusk when the attacks of the horse ceased and night closed in.

Phase 3
As soon as he saw a portion of his troops in motion, the Spartan General Pausanias issued orders to the Lacedaemonians to strike their tents and follow those who had been the first to depart, he was supposing that they were on their march to the place agreed upon.

All the captains but one was willing to obey his orders; Amompharetus, refused to move, saying "I for one will not fly from the strangers, or will I bring disgrace upon Sparta!". It happened that he was absent from the former conference of the captains and so what was now taking place astonished him. Pausanias was horrified at this turn of events, but he still refused to leave without the captain and his men. This made the Spartan force lag behind the rest in evacuating the position and being at the new camp by daybreak.

The Athenians on the other hand, once the troops started to move back toward Plataea, sent a herald to the Spartans to see what they were doing. They knew that it was the attitude of the Spartans to say one thing and do another.

The heard on his arrival found the Spartans still in battle formation and their leaders quarrelling with one another. Pausanias still trying to convince him that a vote had been taken and the decision had been agreed upon to move closer to Plataea. By this stage the Spartan captain had picked up a rock and set it at the feet of Pausanias saying "With this pebble I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias called him a 'fool and a 'madman' then turning to the heard he told him to tell the Athenians what was going on and that they should not be withholding their movement according to what the Spartans were doing.

The heard returned with the message back to the Athenian camp. All efforts for packing up camp and marching back to the new site were becoming fruitless. Until Pausanias came to the decision that if they saw the rest of the Spartans marching out, they would have no option but to move too. So after a long while or arguing, Pausanias gave the order for the rest of the Spartans to move out. No sooner was the signal given than the part willing to march went on their way (including the Teagans, who would not move without the Spartans) while Amompharetus and his men stayed put. The Athenians likewise set off at the same time, but as the middle part of the army was now at their destination and they were separated from the Spartans of some distance, they took a different route to the ones the Spartans took. The Athenians stayed on the low country and marched though the plain, the Spartans on the other hand took a longer route but a safer one by heading to the hilly ground and the skirts of Mount Cithaeron. Both of them loosing bearings of one another during the maneuver.

As for Amompharetus, at first he did not believe that Pausanias would really dare to leave him behind; he therefore remained firm in his resolve to keep his men at their post; when, however, Pausanias and his troops were now some way of, Amompharetus, thinking himself abandoned, ordered his band to take their arms, and led them at a walk toward the main army.

The main army was waiting for them at some distance up ahead waiting to see if they would come to them and they could march as one or if need be to return to their aid if they were being pressed by the Persian horse. Finally, Amompharetus and his men joined the main body.

The Persian cavalry had followed their usual practice and riding up to the Greek camp as the day dawned, when they discovered that the place where the Greeks had been posted was deserted. They then pushed forward without stopping, and, as soon as they overtook the enemy, pressed heavily on them. Causing the Spartan march to a crawl as they had to protect themselves from the arrows.

Mardonius, when he head that the Greeks had retired under cover of the night, and behind the place where they had been stationed, said to the Thessaians accompanying him.

Image from Nicholas Panos DesignWorks E-mail: panicon@otenet.gr 

"You told me the Spartans never fled from battle! You said they were brave and beyond all the rest of mankind. But you yourselves saw them change their place in the line, and here, you can see for yourselves they have run away during the night. When it came time for them to fight the bravest warriors in all the world, they proved no worth at all. I can excuse you, knowing nothing of the Persians, praising these men as great warriors, but Artabazus!? That he had given me council to remove to Thebes and be allowed to be besieged by the Greeks; advice I shall take care to tell the King. But for now we must not allow them to escape, but must pursue after them till we overtake them, and then we must exact vengeance for all the wrongs which have been suffered at their hands by the Persians."

Mardonius then lead his men at full pace to run directly upon the track of the Greeks he believed to be in actual flight. They crossed the Asopus and led the Persians forward at a run. He could not see the Athenians; for as they had taken the way of the plain, they were hidden from his sight by the hills; he therefore led on his troops against the Lacedaemonians and the Tegeans only. When the other divisions of the barbarians saw the Persians pursuing the Greeks so hastily, they all seized their standards, and hurried after at their best speed in great disorder and disarray. On they went with loud shouts and in a wild rout, thinking to swallow up the runaways.

The Spartans sent a heard to the Athenians for assistance, they really needed their archers, as soon as they received the message the Athenians proceeded to organise themselves to help. They drew up in order and put to the march, the Greeks on the kings side however, drew up against them. The Athenians quickly sent a herald to the opposition to say that Greeks should not be fighting Greeks and that they should allow them to help the Spartans. The hearld came back saying that they would not allow this. The Athenians then sent the Spartan hearld back with the message saying that they could not offer assistance while they were about to do battle.
Pausanias would have to make do with what he had at his disposal, 50,000 Spartan and Helots and the 3,000 (ever reliable) Tegeans. The Persians had made a rampart of their wicker shields, and shot from behind them with such clouds of arrows, that the Spartans were being sorely distressed. The Spartans, hiding behind their shields for protection, were waiting for the order to advance. The signs from the sacrifices were not favorable so the Spartans waited on the defensive, while a hail of arrows rained in around them. Many fell on the Spartan side and still more were wounded. Still they waited with their dogged discipline of superb soldiers for their commander to give the signal.

Again and again the signs were not favorable, consternation for Pausanias, with no Athenian help to come and the signs being continually unfavorable for an advance, he could only stand and watch as a stream of advancing Persians were running to back up their archers raining down arrows around him.

At the next offering a frustrated Pausanias turned to the Plataean temple and offered a pray. Not being able to wait any longer and continually frustrated with the Spartans lack of a good omen, the Teagan general gave the order to attack, hoping to stem the increasing amount of archers volleying against them. Rushing forward they were going head long into the thick of the Persian forces. The Spartan soothsayer then gave the augury, the omens were good, the Gods gave their blessing on an attack. After such a long delay, the order to attack would have come to the Spartan contingent with a sigh of relief. 

While the Persians on their side were still shooting they too prepared to meet them. At first the combat was at the wicker shields. Afterwards, when these were swept away, a fierce contest took place by the side of the temple of Demeter, which lasted long, and ended in a hand to hand struggle. The barbarians many times seized hold of the Greek spears and broke them; for in boldness, and warlike spirit the Persians were not inferior to the Greeks; but they fought without superior armour, fighting undisciplined and with less skill in arms. Sometimes they would fight singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer, now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan ranks and thus perished. The carnage continued for a long while.

Artabazus had disapproved about risking a fight and had made great endeavors in the past to avoid battle but all in vain. Now he had his 40,000 men march forward in a orderly way and did not let them brake rank and charge the Greeks as the others had done. Marching at the same pace toward the battle lines.

On the Athenian side, many of the Greeks that faced them played the coward and backed off, not withstanding the Boeotians, on the contrary had a long struggle. Those of the Thebans who were attached to the Medes, displayed especially no little zeal; far from playing the coward, they fought with such fury that three hundred of the best and bravest among them were slain by the Athenians in this passage of arms.

After all the maneuvering and planning by the opposing generals, this was now a soldier's battle.

Looking down from his position on the ridge, Artabazus could see the two battles taking place below him and, while no doubt he was debating whether to cut down through the middle of them, he would have seen the large body of Greeks from Plataea, who should have formed the Greek centre, coming hard and fast to help their comrades. They divided into two main columns, one going to the aid of the Athenians and the other cutting round behind to led strength to the left wing of the Spartans.

As the Greeks that ran to help out the Athenians were running at full speed, they were sighted by the Theban cavalry. About 7,000 Megarians, and other small contingents both from within and outside the Peloponnese ran across open plains to the aid of the Athenians. Even if their discipline had been better than it probably was, their action, thought brave, was somewhat foolhardy in open country. The Theban horse fell upon them and cut them to pieces, killing some six hundred and driving the rest back.

However, though in their actions they they were slaughtered, it did allow relief to the Athenians from the horsemen. The Athenians now could proceed with a straightforward hoplite battle against the Boeotian infantry, whose lines were continually hemorrhaging retreating soliders.
Continually, through the fight the Persians were constantly being reinforced by others running into the battle from the Persian camp. The fight went most against the Greeks where Mardonius, mounted on his white horse, and surrounded by the bravest of all the Persians, of a thousand picked men, fought in person. So long as Mardonius was alive, this body resisted all attacks, and, while they defended their own lives, struck down no small number of Spartans; but after Mardonius fell, and the troops with him, which were the main strength of their army.

The remainder yielded to the Lacedaemonians, and took to flight. Their light clothing, and want of armour, were of the greatest hurt to them; for they had to continue against men heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such defense.

Artabazus before he and his force had even entered the battle, he could see the Persians already in flight, instead of keeping the same order, he wheeled his troops round, and beat a retreat; nor did he even head towards the camp, or even Thebes but headed straight for the Hellespont with all possible speed.

The remainder of the Persian forces took flight, heading back towards their encampment, without preserving any order, and took refuge in their own camp within the wooden defense, which they had raised in the Theban territory.

As for the Athenians, they too began to rout the enemy, who without enough aid from the calvary and loss of their ranks through abandonment, left mostly the Boeotians undermanned and skilled versus the Athenians. They also fled away not however towards the Persian camp, but directly to their city of Thebes.

The victors now pressed on, pursuing and slaying the remnant of the king's army. 
The Persians, and the multitude with them, who fled to the wooden fortress, were able to ascend into the towers before the Lacedaemonians came up. Thus placed, they proceeded to strengthen the defenses as well as they could; and when the Lacedaemonians arrived, a sharp fight took place at the rampart. The Greek penertrate the fortress. So long as the Athenians were away, the barbarians kept off their assailants, and had much the best of the combat, since the Lacedaemonians were unskilled in the attack of walled places. But on the arrival of the Athenians, a more violent attack was made, and the walls were attacked with fury. In the end the valor of the Athenians and their perseverance prevailed, they gained the top of the wall, and, breaking a breach through it, enabled the Greeks to pour in. The first to beak into the camp were the Tegeans, and as soon as the wall was broken down, the barbarians no longer kept together in any array, nor was there any among them who thought of making further resistance. Most by now were half dead with fright, thousands huddled in narrow confined spaces. With such tameness did they submit to be slaughtered by the Greeks.

The Greek did not think of pursuing Artabazus or the Thebans for the moment. For on this day they were content in taking the Persian camp.

Afterwards a golden tripod was made for the victory at Plataea, dedicated at Delphi from the one tenth of the spoils of the battle. In the body is three bronze snakes which include engravement of the names of the cities which took part. 
The memorial was moved to Constantinople (i.e. Istanbul) where the snakes heads have long since vanished. Only the snakes intertwining bodies still remains to this day.

On the very same day the Persian fleet in Asia Minor suffered a heavy defeat at Mycale. These two defeats ended the Persian threat to mainland Greece, and saw the war transferred to the Aegean, Asia Minor and other outlying regions.

In the immediate aftermath of the battle two more Greek contingents, from Mantinea and Elis, reached the field. The Greeks buried their dead in a series of separate mounds, and then advanced to besiege Thebes, the main pro-Persian city. After three weeks the main pro-Persian leaders surrendered, saving the city from a prolonged siege. They were quickly taken away and executed.

Over the next few years leadership in the war against Persian passed from Sparta to Athens. The anti-Persian Delian League slowly turned into an Athenian Empire, and the former allies of the Persian War became the bitter enemies of the First Peloponnesian War and Great Peloponnesian War. At the same time the war against Persia continued, and the Greeks won further victories, most significantly at the Eurymedon River in 466 BC. Peace was probably agreed in c.450-448 by the Peace of Callias, in which the Greeks agreed not to interfere in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persians agreed to accept the autonomy of the Greeks of Asia Minor.

Plataea and Mycale have great significance in ancient history as the battles that decisively ended the second Persian invasion of Greece, thereby swinging the balance of the Greco-Persian Wars in favour of the Greeks. They kept Persia from conquering all of Greece, although they paid a high price by losing many of their men. The Battle of Marathon showed that the Persians could be defeated, and the Battle of Salamis saved Greece from immediate conquest, but it was Plataea and Mycale that effectively ended that threat. However, neither of these battles is nearly as well known as Thermopylae, Salamis or Marathon. The reason for this discrepancy is not entirely clear; it might, however, be a result of the circumstances in which the battle was fought. The fame of Thermopylae certainly lies in the doomed heroism of the Greeks in the face of overwhelming numbers; and Marathon and Salamis perhaps because they were both fought against the odds, and in dire strategic situations. Conversely, the Battles of Plataea and Mycale were both fought from a relative position of Greek strength, and against lesser odds; the Greeks, in fact, sought out battle on both occasions.

Militarily, the major lesson of both Plataea and Mycale (since both were fought on land) was to re-emphasise the superiority of the hoplite over the more lightly armed Persian infantry, as had first been demonstrated at Marathon. Taking on this lesson, after the Greco-Persian Wars the Persian empire started recruiting and relying on Greek mercenaries. One such mercenary expedition, the "Anabasis of the 10,000" as narrated by Xenophon, further proved to the Greeks that the Persians were militarily vulnerable even well within their own territory, and paved the way for the destruction of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great some decades later. 

The historical consequences
A few days later the allies of the Delian League led the siege of Thebes, the city where had taken refuge the remnants of the Persian Army: the city surrendered in twenty days. In the summer of 479 BC, the Persian fleet, surprised at Mycale, in Ionia, was destroyed completely by the Greek commanding Leotichiade; the Persians had been defeated.
The failure against the Greeks had no big impact immediately on Empire, even considering the fact that the defeat of Plataea limited the expansionist policy; indeed the value shown by the Greeks convinced many Satraps (Governors of Persian provinces) to purchase mercenaries Hoplites coming from victorious city.
The Greek cities, however, were aware that a seemingly impossible victory in a war against the Persian Empire was the demonstration that the unity among the people of the Peloponnese was the key to a Greek expansionism even outside Ionic boundaries. And so it was indeed: Pausanias was installed on the Bosphorus, Athens would have renewed and expanded its naval force, other Greek cities began putting colonies throughout the Mediterranean. But when it was time to expanded at East came out the old problems: quarrels, jealousies and misunderstandings not made the Greek expansion comes over the Hellespont. The winners of the Greek-Persian wars then had to "settle" to increase their presence in the Western seas from Sicily to Marseille, renouncing to the East that remained under Persian domain.

What if...
If we consider the distinct superiority of the Persian Cavalry, an eventual victory of the Asians at Plataea could not leave escape to the Greeks. The city of Athens, Sparta and Corinth were supposed to choose between surrender and destruction. But even in the first case, the submission to the Persian Empire would not leave high hopes of freedom, as has been the case for other provinces, neither from a cultural point of view, nor from an economic point of view or political, considering the great opposition of Greek cities versus the conquerors. It's much easier to think that the Greek cities sooner or later would have the same fate of Miletus leaving the fate of European culture, as we know today, entirely in the hands of the Magna Greece or Greek colonies in Italy.
Ultimately then, we can affirm that the cities that were opposed to the Persians at the battle of Plataea were the last bastion of Defense of the Western world against an invader came from the East, which will be repeated in the centuries to come with different protagonists.

Sources /Photos/Bibliography

The main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus, who has been called the 'Father of History',[95] was born in 484 BC in Halicarnassus, Asia Minor (then under Persian overlordship). He wrote his 'Enquiries' (Greek—Historia; English—(The) Histories) around 440–430 BC, trying to trace the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars, which would still have been relatively recent history (the wars finally ending in 450 BC).Herodotus's approach was entirely novel, and at least in Western society, he does seem to have invented 'history' as we know it. As Holland has it: "For the first time, a chronicler set himself to trace the origins of a conflict not to a past so remote so as to be utterly fabulous, nor to the whims and wishes of some god, nor to a people's claim to manifest destiny, but rather explanations he could verify personally".

Some subsequent ancient historians, despite following in his footsteps, criticised Herodotus, starting with Thucydides.Nevertheless, Thucydides chose to begin his history where Herodotus left off (at the Siege of Sestos), and therefore evidently felt that Herodotus's history was accurate enough not to need re-writing or correcting. Plutarch criticised Herodotus in his essay "On The Malignity of Herodotus", describing Herodotus as "Philobarbaros" (barbarian-lover), for not being pro-Greek enough, which suggests that Herodotus might actually have done a reasonable job of being even-handed. A negative view of Herodotus was passed on to Renaissance Europe, though he remained well read. However, since the 19th century his reputation has been dramatically rehabilitated by archaeological finds which have repeatedly confirmed his version of events. The prevailing modern view is that Herodotus generally did a remarkable job in his Historia, but that some of his specific details (particularly troop numbers and dates) should be viewed with skepticism. Nevertheless, there are still some historians who believe Herodotus made up much of his story.

The Sicilian historian, Diodorus Siculus, writing in the 1st century BC in his Bibliotheca Historica, also provides an account of the Battle of Plataea. This account is fairly consistent with Herodotus's, but given that it was written much later, it may well have been derived from Herodotus's version. The Battle is also described in less detail by a number of other ancient historians including Plutarch, Ctesias of Cnidus, and is alluded by other authors, such as the playwright Aeschylus. Archaeological evidence, such as the Serpent Column also supports some of Herodotus's specific claims.

Herodotus (1920). The Histories. with an English translation by A. D. Godley. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. At the Perseus Project of the Tufts University.
Ctesias, Persica (excerpt in Photius's epitome)
Diodorus Siculus (1967). Library. in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H. Oldfather. Cambridge, Mass.; London. At the Perseus Project of the Tufts University.
Plutarch, Aristides
Xenophon, Anabasis
Delbrück, Hans. History of the Art of War Vol I. ISBN 978-0-8032-6584-4
Holland, Tom. Persian Fire. Abacus, 2005. ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1
Green, Peter. The Greco-Persian Wars. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970; revised ed., 1996 (hardcover, ISBN 0-520-20573-1); 1998 (paperback, ISBN 0-520-20313-5).
Gibbon, Edward. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. ISBN 978-0-8095-9235-7
Lazenby, JF. The Defence of Greece 490–479 BC. Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1993. ISBN 0-85668-591-7
Fehling, D. Herodotus and His "Sources": Citation, Invention, and Narrative Art. Translated by J.G. Howie. Arca Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers, and Monographs, 21. Leeds: Francis Cairns, 1989. ISBN 978-0-905205-70-0
Connolly, P. Greece and Rome at War, 1981. ISBN 978-1-84832-609-5
Finley, Moses (1972). "Introduction". Thucydides – History of the Peloponnesian War (translated by Rex Warner). Penguin. ISBN 0-14-044039-9.
Roisman, Joseph; Worthington, Ian (2011). A Companion to Ancient Macedonia. John Wiley and Sons. ISBN 978-1-44-435163-7.
Shepherd, William (2012). Plataea 479 B.C.; The most glorious victory ever seen. Osprey Campaign Series #239. Osprey Publishing. Illustrator: Peter Dennis. ISBN 

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